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Introduction
Debates about politics in today’s China often revolve around oneman—the mysterious Xi Jinping 习近平. (1) Unfortunately, given thenature of the regime, our ability to understand politics in Beijing at
the very top faces serious limitations (Melton and Batke 2017; Teiwes 2015).
Instead of attempting another foray into “Peking-ology,” this article tries a
different approach—asking what we can learn about Xi by looking to his
past. As political scientists have shown, the ideas leaders develop before
coming to power as the result of specific experiences often have significant
explanatory power for their later behaviour (Whitlark 2017; Fuhrmann and
Horowitz 2015; Saunders 2009; Goldgeier 1994). 
Leading scholars such as Kerry Brown and Willy Wo-Lap Lam have already
provided important accounts of Xi’s early life (Brown 2016; Lam 2015). In
1953, Xi was born in Beijing to Xi Zhongxun 习仲勋, a high-ranking party
figure who had spent his early career in north-western Shaanxi Province
and was removed from the central party leadership in 1962. (2) Jinping at-
tended the August 1 Middle School, an elite academy populated mostly by
the offspring of high-ranking military officials. For several years after the
Cultural Revolution began in 1966, radicals harassed Jinping in Beijing on
the basis of his father having been purged, until he became a sent-down
youth, one of the many young men and women who left for the countryside
to “learn from the peasants.” He spent most of this time in Liangjiahe 梁家
河, a small village in the Yan’an 延安 region of poor Shaanxi Province. The
conditions were severe, but by the time he returned to Beijing in 1975, he
was a party member with a ticket to the elite Tsinghua University. 
But what do these experiences tell us about how Xi thinks about the
world? The intention here is not to provide a simple biography. Nor is it to
engage in a psychoanalytic, Freudian approach as other researchers of lead-
ers have done (Pye 1976; George and George 1964). Instead, I categorise
and examine Xi’s early experiences, both before and after the Cultural Rev-
olution started, based on how they might have affected his character traits
in specific ways. I then ask whether Xi’s later behaviour fits our understand-
ing of what we would expect someone with such a background to learn. 
The source material is not perfect. However, the issue is relevant enough,
and the evidence available today interesting enough, to provide an interim
account that, unlike previous scholarship, gives a focused account entirely
on Xi’s early life. Some of the more problematic sources, such as Xi’s own
numerous autobiographical statements and accounts of varying quality pro-
vided by friends and family, should be treated sceptically, as they fit a nar-
rative of political legitimacy (Brown 2016: 50). However, they can be mined
for biographical details, and some of the claims can be treated as possibil-
ities. Crucially, these sources can be heavily supplemented by: memoir lit-
erature written by individuals who had life experiences similar to Xi’s;
reporting by Western journalists; and high-quality Chinese and Western sec-
ondary literature on what we know about Xi’s generation more broadly. 
A generally coherent picture emerges from this evidence. Xi’s early life
does help explain his toughness, idealism, pragmatism, and caution. How-
ever, the material is less clear on how Xi’s youth might have affected his
later behaviour towards potential enemies, both inside and outside the
Party. 
Personal experiences and characteristics 
Why do we care about Xi Jinping? Despite the significance many political
scientists give to structural factors, they have also studied the importance
of individual leaders (Jones and Olken 2009; Byman and Pollack 2001; Ma-
honey and Snyder 1999). Leaders matter for two reasons. First, as Richard
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Samuels has argued, people in positions of high authority often have sig-
nificant freedom of manoeuvre (Samuels 2005). Second, leaders matter be-
cause they have their own ideas about how the world works (George 1969).
One of the key ways in which leaders develop such ideas is through previous
experiences (Kennedy 2012; Jervis 1976). Political scientists have also helped
conceptualise what kinds of leadership traits are the most interesting
(House and Baetz 1990; Hermann 1980). 
The evidence is strong that Xi Jinping’s youth had a role in developing four
key traits that I have gleaned in drawing on my sources. The first is tough-
ness, meaning self-confidence and a belief in personal efficacy. The second
is idealism, defined as conviction, a sense of mission, and antipathy towards
materialism. The third is pragmatism, as in flexibility when selecting means
to achieve concrete goals. The fourth is cautiousness, which includes polit-
ical prudence, self-discipline, and the careful avoidance of demonstrating
any dangerous ambitions (because this last trait disappeared when Xi as-
cended to the top position, it will receive less attention). The evidence on a
potential fifth characteristic—how Xi views the nature of political threats—
is more ambiguous. Some material does suggest that Xi has an exclusionary
policy towards potential enemies, but locating such an attitude entirely
from his early experiences is not straightforward. 
Xi’s formative life experiences
Toughness
Xi’s early life was not easy. His father was almost unbelievably strict; he
attended a school known for its macho relations among students; he was
harassed in Beijing during the early years of the Cultural Revolution; and his
time as a sent-down youth was particularly brutal in terms of both physical
and emotional hardship. 
Xi Zhongxun’s strictness toward his family members was so serious that
even those close to him believed it bordered on the inhuman (Zhang 2013:
230). In 1993, Jinping said that when he was young he was most afraid of
his father waking him up to bathe him in the water just used for Zhongxun’s
own bath (Hao 2013: 763). According to one friend of Xi’s family, Zhongxun
was “happiest” talking about instances of his son behaving “full of mettle.” (3)
Apparently this behaviour was not unique—another princeling similarly re-
calls a brutally disciplinarian father (Kong 2013: 25).
The August 1 Middle School, known as the “CCP military aristocracy
school,” was also uncompromising. According to one graduate, “softness
and delicateness were especially despised.” Brawls were common. (4) Al-
though after the Cultural Revolution started the school was depicted as an
“aristocracy school” corrupted by special privileges, which undoubtedly had
at least some truth, former educators and students deny this characterisa-
tion. The school was organised according to military discipline, and during
the Great Leap Forward students were forced to eat old rice contaminated
by rat faeces (Li 2007: 53, 97-98). 
The situation was especially difficult for Xi. The students from top families
were not allowed to become student cadres. (5) Nor were these children al-
lowed to bully the offspring of lower ranking cadres, although the reverse
was apparently surprisingly common. (6) But after 1962, when Xi was only
nine years old, he was not just the son of a top leader—he was the son of
a fallen leader. At least one student was not permitted to enter the Com-
munist Youth League simply because his father had had a connection with
Xi Zhongxun. (7) Given that some accounts suggest that August 1 students
cared deeply about the rank of their fathers, the status of Zhongxun must
have affected his son (Li 2007: 97; Kong 2013). 
However difficult the middle school might have been, life got even harder
with the onset of the Cultural Revolution. In 1996, Xi’s former teacher Chen
Qiuying 陈秋影 wrote, “Because of the irregular political life of his father
and mother during the Cultural Revolution, he suffered extremely unfair
treatment, and Xi Jinping was also seen by some as a ‘one of the five black
elements, a bastard,’ and a ‘reactionary student.’” According to Chen, Xi “al-
ways believed that the clouds would disperse; under any circumstance he
always was very confident of the future.” (Li 2007: 232)
Although Jinping did not participate directly in the Red Guard movement
because of his father’s status, he was close to many of the offspring of top
officials who dominated the movement’s early phases (Nie and Wang 2011:
109). These individuals believed that their “Red genes” made them the true
heirs of the revolution, rendering them unpopular among other students
(Walder 2012). Xi would have known about how many of these students
formed the Liandong 联动 (United Action) Red Guard faction in the hope
of protecting their parents. This group ultimately suffered terribly when it
was overcome by other groups supported by the central authorities (Mi
2011: 233-49). On January 25, 1967, the August 1 Middle School was as-
saulted by leftist forces and more than 30 students were detained, although
according to some sources its student population was largely apolitical (Li
2007: 312-47). Shortly after, the school was closed down and turned into
an exhibition showcasing the alleged special privileges of its students (Chun-
lei 1967).
Xi later recalled that the “leftist rebels” accused him of many crimes, al-
legedly believing he was a leader (tou 头) because he bucked them and re-
fused to be bullied. (8) According to a family friend, Xi’s own mother
participated in a struggle session against Jinping after he was incarcerated
at the central party school for criticising the Cultural Revolution. When a
hungry Jinping fled home one night from the party school, his mother not
only refused to feed him but even reported him to the authorities. (9) In
1968, Xi and his friends Nie Weiping 聂卫平 and Liu Weiping 刘卫平 ran
away when hundreds of students with clubs ran out to physically attack
participants of a meeting they were attending. Xi and Nie escaped, but Liu,
who was too slow, was beaten severely (Nie and Wang 2011: 109). 
The sent-down youth period was also gruelling. Xi was not only one of
the youngest of these individuals; in addition, he spent a much longer time
in the countryside than most others. By 1975, when Xi finally left, only 3.7%
of the original sent-down youth were still in the Yan’an region in Shaanxi
Province, where Xi lived, and those who had remained mostly did so because
they had married peasants (Zhongyang dangxiao caifang shilu bianji shi
2017: 438). Moreover, the region was particularly poor and isolated. One
sent-down youth in the same area as Xi recalls the shock he felt when he
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saw three of the six children of a brigade leader (duizhang 队长) playing in
the dirt with no clothes. (10) More than 70 of the rusticated young people
died in this region, 32 during labour and 40-plus from “irregular deaths” or
disease. (11)
The physical labour was especially difficult for the particularly young Xi
(Zhongyang dangxiao caifang shilu bianji shi 2017: 94). Because of his fam-
ily’s situation, Xi could not hope to leave the countryside by either joining
the People’s Liberation Army or finding work in a city (Zhongyang dangxiao
caifang shilu bianji shi 2017: 143). The situation was so tough that after
only about three months Xi fled back to Beijing, where he was placed in a
“study group.” (12)
Many years later, Xi told an interviewer, “Nothing could be as hard as that.
This has a very strong effect on a person.” (13) He also stated, “With that kind
of experience, whatever difficulties I would encounter in the future, I am fully
charged with the courage to take on any challenge, to believe in the impos-
sible and to conquer obstacles without panic.” (14) Xi continued to emphasise
these macho qualities after becoming head of the Party. At the 19th Party
Congress, Xi stated, “History looks kindly on those with resolve, with drive
and ambition, and with plenty of guts; it won’t wait for the hesitant, the ap-
athetic, or those shy of a challenge.” (15) Xi has also blamed the collapse of
the Soviet Union on no one being “man enough” to fight to save it. (16)
Idealism
Xi Jinping not only developed a strong sense of self-confidence; the evi-
dence indicates he also became highly idealistic. One can find three likely
roots of this trait: the first was that Xi’s father was a revolutionary fanati-
cally devoted to the party’s historical mission; secondly, Jinping’s middle
school heavily indoctrinated students in the importance of sacrifice; and
thirdly, Jinping developed a sense of affection and duty towards the peasants
with whom he lived in Shaanxi. Throughout his life, Xi has demonstrated a
fascination with the importance of conviction. 
Many offspring of revolutionary figures came to see themselves as the in-
heritors of the revolution and as future leaders of China (Mi 2016: 127). Xi
Jinping appears to have been among them. According to Jinping, as a child:
[he heard his father talk] about how he joined the revolution, and
he’d say, ‘You will certainly make revolution in the future.’ (…) He’d
explain what revolution is. We heard so much of this that our ears
got calluses. (17)
In a birthday letter written to his father, Jinping described Zhongxun’s ide-
alism as one of the five traits he most wanted to study. (18)
Besides the influence from his father, China’s education system during Jin-
ping’s youth focused on ideals and conviction (Mi 2016). The atmosphere
at the August 1 Middle School was electric. The students there “were full of
resolution to give their lives the desire to struggle, the will to serve, the col-
lective spirit, sincere belief and traditional pursuits, and at the same time
were full to the brim with the special confidence and pride of victors.” (19)
The August 1 Middle School’s special status often gave its students a sense
of superiority (Li 2007).
Hagiographic treatments of Xi portray his stint among peasants while in
the countryside as crucial for understanding his devotion to the nation. One
may naturally wonder how much of this type of talk is simply propaganda,
as some scholars have emphasised that the Cultural Revolution was in fact
powerfully disillusioning for many young people (Yang 2017; Chan 1985). 
But if the hagiographic stories are basically correct, why was it that his
own rural experience did not lead Xi to despondency? First, Xi was no regular
sent-down youth. He was the son of a high-ranking official, and as the Chi-
nese historian Gao Wenqian 高文谦 notes, although some of these individ-
uals did indeed lose their idealism during the Cultural Revolution, for most
of them the sense of historical mission they developed as children generally
proved resilient (Gao 2016: 415).
But we also have reason to believe that the sent-down youth experience
actually increased Xi’s devotion. According to numerous accounts, many
young people cried when their trains left Beijing for the countryside (Bonnin
2013: 231; Luo 1999: 238-39). Others, like the princeling Kong Dan 孔丹,
hoped that the countryside would be a new start after the traumatic expe-
riences in Beijing (Kong 2013: 111). Xi recalls:
On the special train to Yan’an, I remember very clearly, that was Jan-
uary 1969, everyone was crying; on the whole special train there was
no one who was not crying, except for me who was laughing. At the
time my family standing outside the car all said, how could you be
laughing? I said if I was staying I would be crying, if I did not go I don’t
even know if I would live or die here, so isn’t leaving a good thing? (20)
The evidence is not clear as to how long it took Xi to develop an affection
for the villagers, and life there was certainly not easy. But ultimately Xi tied
gratefulness to the peasants for taking care of him to his own political ide-
alism and sense of mission. On the night before he left, he told the entire
village: “Our masses in Liangjiahe selflessly accepted me, helped me, made
me enter society, enter the Communist Youth League, enter the Party, be-
come party village head (…). For my entire life, I will not forget what Liangji-
ahe gave me.” (Zhongyang dangxiao caifang shilu bianji shi 2017: 197). In
2004, Xi told an interviewer, “At the time of my life when I most needed all
kinds of help, the people of Yan’an gave me a selfless helping hand.” (21) If Xi
was like Kong Dan, who was in the same region, he might have been struck
by the “inequality in life and inequality in fate” the peasants faced and de-
veloped a sense of responsibility to improve their lives (Kong 2013: 127).
Given these factors in Xi’s childhood and adolescence, we do have some
reason to believe that he may not have been untruthful when he stated: 
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Now some authors in their works write about sent-down youths in
a very brutal way. My feeling was not entirely like that. (22)
Kong Dan (2013: 113) also later recalled, “I actually really appreciated that
time period, it was very innocent.” Another sent-down youth wrote: 
When our lives were at their lowest point, when we were at our most
helpless, the Northern Shaanxi people opened their minds to accept
us. Just as when our fathers’ generation was nourished by the yellow
soil in the Yan’an era, today the yellow soil opened its great bosom to
accept their offspring. I’m afraid the great kindness that brought boun-
ties to two generations is very difficult to pay back in this lifetime. (23)
Added together, these features of Xi’s background contribute to an un-
derstanding of why he has repeatedly exhibited a preoccupation with ideals
over his life. He was close friends with the late author Jia Dashan 贾大山,
whose works showed scepticism towards the new materialistic values that
appeared with Deng Xiaoping’s 邓小平 reforms. (24) In one of Jia’s most fa-
mous works, The Flower Market, a young peasant woman refuses to sell an
expensive flower to a bossy, rich cadre who offers a high price, selling it in-
stead to a poor old man struck only by the flower’s beauty. (25) Xi is also a
fan of The One-Dimensional Man by the Marxist German philosopher Her-
bert Marcuse. He has praised the book for criticising the tendency of indus-
trial society to turn people into “one-dimensional technical animals” who
have no human spirit. (26) In December 1989, Xi complained about how the
“value system of capitalist extreme egoism” was still “poisoning people’s
souls” and warned about the persistence of “commodity fetishism.” (27)
Xi has even used these ideas to explain the collapse of the USSR, as in the
following quotation: 
Why did the Soviet Union disintegrate? Why did the Soviet Commu-
nist Party collapse? An important reason was that their ideals and
convictions wavered (…). In the end nobody was a real man, nobody
came out to resist. (28)
He has applied this concern directly to China, arguing, “Facts have repeat-
edly proved that the most dangerous moment is when one wavers in or be-
gins to show doubt about one’s ideals and convictions.” (29) This sense of
mission is a significant difference between Xi and his predecessors Hu Jintao
胡锦涛 and Wen Jiaobao 温家宝, two leaders whom former general-secre-
tary Zhao Ziyang 赵紫阳 once described as “lacking ideals, lacking historical
responsibility, and lacking vision.” (Zong 2007: 348).
Pragmatism
Although Xi prides himself on his toughness and sense of conviction, in-
terestingly these traits have not translated either into an absence of flexi-
bility as to means or into dangerously ambitious policies (except perhaps
in the war on corruption). Again the past may provide clues why. The early
Cultural Revolution in Beijing and his sent-down youth experiences again
played a part in his character formation. These events seem to have incul-
cated in Xi a powerful sense of pragmatism because they clearly demon-
strated the failure of radical leftist politics. Moreover, as a rusticated young
person Xi was exposed at an early age to the reality of local politics in the
complicated environment of a Chinese village. 
Propaganda accounts have emphasised this side of Xi. But sociologists and
other experts on the Cultural Revolution have also seen Xi’s generation as
pragmatic (Xu 1999: 228). Their experiences in the countryside led many
young Chinese of that era not only to question the wisdom of “class strug-
gle,” but also to challenge a number of “economic, societal, cultural, and
other policy questions.” The previously heavily indoctrinated students were
shocked by the situation in the villages, which contributed to their reflec-
tions about which policies the country really ought to pursue (Yin 2009:
216, 286). These youths were also primed for such reflection by a number
of local conditions: the countryside’s less controlling atmosphere as com-
pared with the cities; the complete lack of teachers who would have at-
tempted to indoctrinate them; the obvious gap they discovered between
communist theory and lived reality; and the pressing needs of the peasants
(Mi 2011: 337-38). These takeaways played a significant role in the wide
support for the reforms of the Deng era (Wang 2013: 77). 
In the 1980s, high-ranking officials also noticed this practical bent among
Xi’s generation. One man who worked for the Organisation Department
wrote a special report on the “three old classes” (lao sanjie 老三届, a term
referring to those scheduled to graduate high school in 1966-1968): “They
are proficient in their jobs, they have a lot of life experience, they do not
reach beyond their grasp, they are not anxious for quick results, they come
to work on time and leave on time, are steady in their work, and are reli-
able.” (Cui 2003: 85). In 1980, Xi’s own father said, “They are sensitive to
reality, they dare to think and to do, and they are relatively strong in edu-
cation and ability to understand.” (30) In a February 1983 document, a high-
ranking official involved in cadre promotion wrote that Xi was one of several
young officials who deserved to be given more authority because, “Although
they are college graduates, they all tumbled (shuaida 摔打) at the local level
for seven or eight years” and understood how to work with the masses (He
2016: 56). 
Xi himself has often expressed a distaste for the utopian politics of the
Mao era. In 2003, Xi recalled that “when the ideals of the Cultural Revolution
could not be realised, it proved an illusion.” (31) In an interview in 2004, he
reflected on the dangers of radical impractical thinking and recalled how
his fellow city-bred youth once criticised the villagers they were living with
for not being cruel enough to a former rich peasant: “It was dogmatic; it
was a result of not having seen the real world.” (32) On a trip to Peking Uni-
versity in May 2018, Xi described his coming to believe in Marxism during
this time period as a result of independently, critically, and slowly studying
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Marxist texts, and he emphasised that studying should always include a
practical mind-set. (33)
This experience of rural life and the ideals that were incorrectly applied
to it was important for Xi not only because it demonstrated problems with
utopian thinking. As a school of politics, the northern Shaanxi countryside
had its own special characteristics. (34) The region was a complicated mixture
of families, clans, villages, and production teams (Zhongyang dangxiao
caifang shilu bianji shi 2017: 26). In 2003, when Xi listed the two most im-
portant results of his time as a sent-down youth, the first one he mentioned
was understanding “the meaning of actual practice, the meaning of seeking
truth from facts, the meaning of the masses. This is something that was
valuable for my entire life.” (“Fujian boshi fengcai” congshu bianwei hui
2003: 2). Kong Dan (2013: 127) similarly argues that when he arrived in the
countryside he was “a bit of nerd” (xuesheng qiang 学生腔) but that the in-
teraction with peasants left in him a more practical sensibility. Interestingly,
this transformation was probably Mao’s intention—the Chairman had re-
peatedly voiced concerns that, “The offspring of our cadres are really wor-
rying; they do not have life or societal experience.” (Beijing shi jiaoyu
geming lianluo weiyuan hui 1967: 1)
Likely because of these reasons, despite Xi’s praise for Marxism as an ideal
and motivating force, he has not interpreted it as encompassing a set of in-
flexible rules. In 1983, an investigation team from the Organisation Depart-
ment was impressed by Xi’s commitment to reform and his sense of the
problems with collectivism in agriculture (Yan 2017: 217). In the early
1990s, Xi wrote: 
Actually Marxism is not abstruse. Marxism is a very matter-of-fact
thing, a very matter-of-fact logic. (35)
Another theme in the works of Jia Dashan, the author cherished by Xi, is
the absurdity of arbitrary “leftist” political standards set by leaders without
practical skills. (36)
Later as an official in Fujian, Xi criticised cadres with book-learning but no
real world experiences who rushed to achieve half-baked projects. (37) Since
taking up national-level power, Xi has proven to be extremely practical in
terms of reforms, not relying entirely on either the state or the market and
emphasising stability over radical change. (38) One American embassy con-
tact described Xi as “supremely pragmatic and a realist, driven not by ide-
ology.” (39)
Political caution
As with his pragmatism, Xi’s caution and professed lack of ambition—at
least up until he assumed the top position—contrasted with his toughness
and idealism. Indeed, the historical record is full of examples of such facets
of his nature. Like the characteristics discussed above, Xi’s caution was likely
rooted in earlier experiences—in this case, his prolonged vulnerability. Xi’s
ability to hide certain parts of his personality suggests that his rougher edges
were tempered by cunning and a keen sensitivity to how to best protect
himself and move up the ranks. Xi’s behaviour in this regard strongly differs
from that of another member of his generational cohort who was also a son
of a former high-ranking official, the now infamous Bo Xilai 薄熙来.
The timing of Xi Zhongxun’s purge was of crucial importance to the de-
velopment of caution in his son. As Chinese historian Gao Wenqian notes,
Zhongxun was purged four years before the Cultural Revolution. At that
time, Jinping was very young, and the fathers of his friends would still have
been untouched. Gao (2016: 414) writes: 
Xi Jinping was only nine years old when his father fell, so the tough
environment directly influenced his personality. He is therefore good
at forbearance and concealing his intentions, not revealing anything.
Zhang Lifan 章立凡, another historian, similarly argues: 
I think [Xi] has learned how to survive. In his childhood, Xi Jinping
suffered a lot. All of this experience greatly affected him.
One more such analysis comes from Li Datong 李大同, a former editor of
a news journal: 
Xi Jinping is very low-profile and cautious, which might have some
connection with his past experience in the 1960s when his father
was kicked out of the power centre. He actually did not enjoy many
benefits assumed to be extended to the ‘princelings’ in those
times. (40)
Xi’s reticence persisted throughout most of his life. One individual who
knew him shortly before the Cultural Revolution described Xi as “not talking
a lot, very discreet” and claimed he was not an individual who sought fame
or power. (41) The official collection of interviews on the sent-down youth
period provides further examples of what could well have been caution on
Xi’s part. At one large struggle session, some cadres were attacked for not
sufficiently emphasising women’s issues. Xi and a friend believed that such
a mistake was at most a contradiction among the people. But when Xi’s
friend said he wanted to jump on stage and stop the proceedings, Xi calmed
him down (Zhongyang dangxiao caifang shilu bianji shi 2017: 70).
Another instance occurred when Xi finally left the countryside and en-
tered university. In 1976, he counselled his fellow classmates against par-
ticipating in the Tiananmen protests against the Gang of Four, even
though he claimed to support their position (Zhongyang dangxiao caifang
shilu bianji shi, 2017: 76). According to a family friend, when Xi, who ap-
parently did go to the Square anyway just to look around, saw his younger
brother there, he forced the brother to leave so that no pictures of them
could be taken. (42)
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Throughout his career, Xi made few enemies, again perhaps a sign of his
caution. In 1983, Organisation Department investigators were struck by Xi’s
modest and assuming nature, although some local officials were jealous of
Xi’s rapid advancement given his youth (Yan 2017: 217). Evan Osnos writes
that Xi was “an unremarkable provincial administrator” who was “selected
mainly because he had alienated fewer peers than his competitors.” (43) Xi
also never took dangerous initiatives or displayed ambition. When he was
party chief of Zhejiang 浙江, liberal party elder Li Rui 李锐 told him, “Now
your position is different; you can raise a few ideas with the higher-ups.” Xi
said, “How could I be like you? You know how to walk a fine line.” (Li 2013:
459). According to Willy Wo-Lap Lam (2015: 41): “Xi was always anxious to
project the image of a humble student of his elders—and a team player.”
This evidence raises an important question—why did another famous
member of Xi’s generational cohort, Bo Xilai, not share Xi’s cautious political
style? Bo, the former party boss of Chongqing, was expelled from the party
for corruption shortly before Xi came to power. Like Xi, Bo also believed his
early life had had a toughening effect, remarking at one press conference that:
I was locked up in prison because of my father [the famous revolu-
tionary Bo Yibo]. The experience toughened my will and taught me
how to think. (44)
Bo’s war on corruption and resurrection of leftist imagery and symbols
when he served as party secretary in Chongqing are so similar to the policies
Xi has adopted as leader that some analysts have called Xi’s policies “the
Bo Xilai line without Bo Xilai.” (45) In 2010, on a trip to Chongqing, Xi told
Bo the “singing red” campaign had “gone deeply into the hearts of the peo-
ple and was worthy of praise” (Garnaut 2013: 64). Despite these broad sim-
ilarities, however, Bo was a cocky, incredibly ambitious man who had a
dangerous habit of creating enemies. (46)
Although it is impossible to say for sure why Xi and Bo displayed such
different behaviour, Bo’s early life can be distinguished in crucial ways from
Xi’s. Bo was about four years older than Xi when the Cultural Revolution
started, and Bo’s father was purged several years later than Xi’s. Therefore,
as historian Gao Wenqian remarks, Bo faced serious setbacks in life “when
he was in high school and his personality had already been formed, so al-
though when he was [treated like] a bastard, he also had to rely on for-
bearance to survive, as soon as the situation changed, his previous
impudent personality reappeared.” (Gao 2016: 414). As will be discussed
in the next section, it was much later before Xi clearly displayed a ruthless
side. 
View of friends and enemies
Xi’s early experiences help explain why he has often displayed toughness,
idealism, pragmatism, and caution. Regarding the question of how Xi’s early
life affected his understanding of the nature of political contradictions, how-
ever, the evidence is mixed. On the one hand, the Cultural Revolution was
a time period in which many young men and women engaged in unre-
stricted political warfare. The Mao era showed the dangers of political weak-
ness in the face of enemies, as well as the threat of chaos in the absence of
strong political order. On the other hand, many in Xi’s generation believed
that the brutality of the Mao era demonstrated a need for a more institu-
tionalised kind of politics that prevented uncontrolled power struggles and
allowed more freedoms in society. Given these two seemingly incompatible
beliefs, it is not clear what lessons Xi drew from this period, nor is it obvious
how exactly to classify his views on this matter. 
Certainly, we have at least some reason to believe that Xi’s experiences
were conducive to becoming obsessed with domination and control. Xi
spent years in an education system that emphasised class struggle,
which taught that the fight against enemies was eternal and ubiquitous,
that enemies could be behind any problem, that anyone could be an
enemy, and that enemies should be treated viciously (Mi 2011: 63-64).
Then, the Cultural Revolution ushered in a period of political struggle
with few limits. Chinese sociologist and historian Xu Youyu 徐 友 渔
(1999: 234) argues, the Cultural Revolution created a “moral crisis and
moral vacuum”:
For some people, any conventions are false and damaging, and any
restrictions should be smashed. Sticking to rules became a manifes-
tation of pedantry and ossification, and some basic norms of be-
haviour, like maintaining promises, obeying laws [zunfa shouji 尊法
守纪] [like in work fulfilling one’s duties, not taking advantage of state
property] were completely cast away. These people simply do not
care about integrity and guarding against temptation. If doing a bad
thing is not discovered, or if it is discovered but there is no punish-
ment, then they will do anything they want.
Xu (1999: 236) concludes that the Red Guards learned: 
In order to get benefit, it is necessary to have power. The desire for
power in this generation, the sensitivity to how power is divided, is
definitely beyond that of others.
Literary historian Qian Liqun 钱理群 worries that Xi’s generation learned
in the struggles of the Cultural Revolution that “in order to gain one’s ob-
jective, any method is appropriate.” (47) Kong Dan (2013: 126) similarly sug-
gests that Nie Weiping’s style of playing Go—“You come according to the
rules, he operates in violation of the rules, fights chaotically”—was a result
of the Cultural Revolution.
Some evidence suggests that Xi did develop a suspicious, aggressive atti-
tude towards enemies and a fear of chaos. In 2000, he told an interviewer: 
People who have little experience with power, those who have been
far away from it, tend to regard these things as mysterious and novel.
But I look past the superficial things: the power and the flowers and
the glory and the applause. I see the detention houses, the fickleness
of human relationships. (48)
Xi (1992: 62) very revealingly referred to the Cultural Revolution in a
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Special feature
speech he gave in Ningde, Fujian Province, at a work conference on media
issues in May 1989—shortly before the crackdown on protests in Beijing:
Wasn’t the “Cultural Revolution” the manifestation of “big democ-
racy”? This kind of “big democracy” is not in accord with science, not
in accord with the rule of law, but is instead in accord with supersti-
tion, in accord with stupidity, and the result is major chaos. Anyone
can organise a few people to go and ransack homes, anyone can pull
together a struggle unit, today I knock you down, tomorrow you
knock me down. Can these days be repeated? Without stability and
unity, nothing is possible!
However, many individuals determined that the lesson of the Cultural Revolu-
tion was the need for more democracy, not less. Xi’s own father was one of these
individuals, having concluded that strengthening the institutions of inner-party
democracy and guaranteeing more personal freedoms were necessary for pre-
venting Mao era abuses from repeating. (49) Historian Wang Haiguang (2013: 77)
has written that the most obvious lesson of the Cultural Revolution was that: 
[China] could only conform to human civilisation’s great road of uni-
versal values and concept of modern human rights, to walk the road
of ruling the nation by law, a society of citizens, and democratic pol-
itics. It absolutely cannot again engage in populist revolutionary rebel
campaigns.
When the Cultural Revolution started, Xi Jinping apparently was indeed
thinking about the implications of what was happening around him. Then
13 years old, he asked his teacher Chen Qiuying how such violence could
happen. (50) A few years later, as a sent-down youth, he saw more evidence
of the disasters that could emerge from this kind of politics. According to
an official collection of interviews on this period, as a sent-down youth “Jin-
ping gradually began to doubt the long-term incessant severe class strug-
gle.” (Zhongyang dangxiao caifang shilu bianji shi 2017: 43). When he
temporarily worked in the village of nearby Zhaojiahe 赵家和, he was unable
to find any real “class enemies” or “capitalist tendencies,” so he held no
struggle sessions (Zhongyang dangxiao caifang shilu bianji shi 2017: 69).
How, then, should one explain instances of Xi’s aggressive attitude to-
wards potential threats inside and outside the Party since coming to power
(Saich 2017; Caster 2017)? If Xi drew only one set of lessons, the need to
crush enemies and prioritise stability above all else, and not another, the
need to avoid a politics of struggle and exclusion, that would be enor-
mously revealing of what kind of person Xi is. Another possibility is that
his position as top leader changed him—his own father Zhongxun once
said, “This thing power depraves people” (quanli zhege dongxi fushi ren a
权力这个东西腐蚀人啊). (Chen 2013: 423). As the work of John Garnaut
reveals, princelings argue about whether Bo Xilai’s youthful experience re-
ally had any effect on his “later excesses” (Garnaut 2013: 28). Xi himself
may be struggling with the question of how to balance the duelling lessons
of the Mao era. 
Conclusion
In 1984, the author Ke Yunlu 柯云路 published a novel, New Star, which
included a character bearing such a strong resemblance to Xi Jinping that
some wondered whether the character was in fact partly based on him (Ke
2016). In March 2017, Ke was asked what could be learned about the cur-
rent generation of leadership from New Star. Ke answered:
They are comparatively strong. They dare to act.
They have a consciousness of reform. In some areas they are not
sticklers for the legacy of their predecessors.
They have a strong consciousness of national revival.
They have ample political experience.
They are idealists as well as pragmatists, but everything depends on
feasibility. (51)
As Ke’s list and the evidence provided above suggest, a generally consis-
tent mosaic of the characteristics of Xi and some others among his gener-
ation had already emerged many years ago. How the potentially
contradictory impulses will play out remain to be seen. On the one hand,
China is now led by a tough individual on a mission to save the PRC, a plan
that includes restoring faith in the CCP’s historic mission. However, within
the broader context of Xi’s belief in the importance of personal motivation
and conviction, he has proven to be quite flexible with regard to means.
Mao used to emphasise the difference between being principled in strategy
and flexible in tactics —Xi has apparently inherited this concept. 
Whether Xi’s historically-formed worldview will help or hurt regime re-
siliency over the long term today remains to be seen. A leader with another
set of historical baggage might have settled on a different path to shore up
the PRC, one that enhanced stability by unambiguously supporting collec-
tive leadership and inner-party democracy; fought corruption by employing
the media and improving the rule of law; provided more rights to its citizens;
and ambitiously pursued the reforms necessary for China’s long-term eco-
nomic vibrancy. Xi has bet China’s future on a rather different set of policies. 
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